

A TRANSLATION FROM THE RUSSIAN OF

Soviet Military Strategy

V. D. Sokolovskii

WITH ANALYSIS AND ANNOTATION BY

H. Dinerstein, L. Gouré, and T. Wolfe

April 1963

R-416-PR

A REPORT PREPARED FOR

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

The **RAND** *Corporation*

1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

ВОЕННАЯ СТРАТЕГИЯ

*Под редакцией Маршала Советского Союза
СОКОЛОВСКОГО В. Д.*

ВОЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО
МИНИСТЕРСТВА ОБОРОНЫ СССР

Москва—1962

The present study was written by the following committee of authors: Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskii (chairman); Colonel A. I. Belaev; Doctor of Military Sciences Professor Colonel General A. I. Gastilovich (worked on Chapter 7); Colonel V. K. Denisenko; Major General I. G. Zav'ialov; Major General V. V. Kolechitskii; Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. V. Larionov; Colonel G. M. Nyrkov; Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel I. V. Parot'kin; Major General A. A. Prokhorov; Colonel A. S. Popov; Colonel K. I. Sal'nikov; Colonel A. N. Shimanskii; Major General M. I. Cherednichenko; Colonel A. I. Shchegolev.

Helpful advice was given by Lieutenant General P. Ia. Mordvintsev, Lieutenant General S. P. Platonov, Major General A. N. Strogii, Major General N. P. Tsygichko.

The book was prepared for the press by Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. V. Larionov.

blows can to an enormous extent determine the entire subsequent course of the war and result in losses in the homeland and among the troops which could place the people and the country in a difficult situation.⁸⁾

Strategy and Politics

The Dependence of Military Strategy on Politics. In defining the essential nature of war, Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the proposition that war is not an aim in itself, but rather a tool of policy.

In his remarks on Clausewitz's book *Vom Kriege* [*On War*], V. I. Lenin stressed that "politics is the guiding force, and war is only the tool, not vice versa. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political." *

The acceptance of war as a tool of politics determines the relationship of military strategy to politics and makes the former completely dependent upon the latter.

The representatives of the bourgeois metaphysical approach to war, who deny its class essence, have attacked and are still attacking these scientific Marxist propositions. They do not perceive the cause of any war to be in the policies followed by the state before the war, but rather in the "psychological makeup" of man, the overpopulation of the earth (Malthusians and neo-Malthusians), and in racist geopolitics.

Such theories have always played into the hands of extreme militarists, who deny the dependence of military strategy upon politics. This idea was exemplified by the German military writer F. Bernhardt, who asserted that policy must "adjust its demands to what is militarily expedient and feasible." † The German military ideologists of World War I, Schlieffen and Ludendorff, in justifying their militaristic aspirations, argued that politics, having accomplished its aim by starting the war, becomes a passive observer at the beginning of military operations.

The views of bourgeois military theoreticians of the past find adherents even among the present-day military ideologists of modern imperialism.

Thus, the English military theoretician Kingston-McCloughry writes with regard to the Clausewitz formula:

But take his most famous pronouncement that "war is the continuation of policy by other means," viz., by force, and consider it in the

⁸ *Pravda*, October 25, 1961. See also Marshal R. Malinovskii, "The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Question of Strengthening the Armed Forces of the USSR," *Kommunist*, No. 7, May 1962, p. 19.

* See V. I. Lenin, *Leninskii sbornik* [*Lenin's Collected Works*], XII, 2nd edition, 1931, p. 437.

† F. Bernhardt, *Sovremennaia voina* [*Modern War*], Vol. II, St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 148.

light of present-day conditions. Nothing would seem further from the truth in the event of nuclear warfare. Such a war if wholly unleashed, would be the end of all policies and an utter mutual annihilation.*

He is echoed by the West German military theoretician Rendulič, a former Nazi general, who, in the article entitled "Armament Changes Politics," declares that ". . . the nuclear weapon introduced radical changes in the form of warfare and its relation to politics. . . . Nuclear war has lost its significance as a political instrument."⁹

It is quite evident that such views are the consequence of a metaphysical and anti-scientific approach to a social phenomenon such as war and are the result of idealization of the new weapons. It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and armament. The imperialist ideologists require contrary conclusions to justify their preparations for a new war and to subordinate the development of economics, science, and technology to the requirements of military organization. In their opinion, it is not the civil but rather the military organization which, with science, has taken over the leadership.

At the same time, regardless of such declarations by individual authors, bourgeois military science recognizes the dependence of war and military strategy on politics. True, bourgeois politics in this case is presented as the expression of the interests of the entire society, which in reality is not the case. Thus, the class content is removed from politics and it is represented as a national [classless], primarily foreign, policy. However, such a policy cannot be pursued in a society consisting of antagonistic classes since, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, neither nonclass nor supra-class politics exist.

The dependence of military strategy on politics finds most varied expression. Political influence is manifested in the determination of general and particular strategic aims, in the general nature of state strategy, and in the selection of the method and form of waging war.

V. I. Lenin declared that the nature of the political aim has a decisive influence on the conduct of war. Indeed, it is the political aim which determines whether the war is just or unjust that has a basic influence on strategy. In one case [of a just war] the wholehearted endorsement of the war aims by the people reinforces the strategy, and in the other case [of an unjust war] the people may not share these aims, and the extent of their participation in the war is sharply reduced.

The decisiveness of political war aims will vary with the depth of

* E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, *Global'naiia strategii*, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1959, p. 290 [English edition *Global Strategy*, Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 248].

⁹ U.S. ED. NOTE—It has not been possible to locate the original article.

the contradictions between states or coalitions of states in the war. The most decisive political and, consequently, strategic aims are pursued in civil or revolutionary class wars. Wars between states with different social systems are particularly decisive, inasmuch as these are a higher form of the class struggle. In wars between states with the same social system, when there are no social contradictions between the antagonists, the political and strategic aims are usually limited. In such wars, compromises of various types are possible long before the belligerents are economically and militarily exhausted. This type of strategy is characteristic of participants in imperialist wars in which both sides pursue predatory aims.

The subordination of military strategy to state policy not only determines the nature of the strategic aims, but also the general nature of strategy.

For example, the policy of imperialism as an outmoded social system is to attempt to forestall its inevitable downfall and to prevent the historically determined development of socialism in the world.

Being reactionary and adventuristic by nature, the policies of imperialist countries also produce a military strategy founded on adventuristic calculations. By their character, such strategies ignore the laws of armed combat, the permanently operating factors and the role of the popular masses, and expect to exploit a combination of political and strategic situations in order to attack treacherously in violation of international treaties and agreements.

The general nature of military strategy is strongly influenced by the guiding idea or general line of state policy. The existence of such an idea renders military strategy firm and consistent. For example, the general political line of the CPSU, whose essential nature was so graphically expressed during the XXIInd Party Congress, is the building of a communist society. In achieving this goal, our country has to sustain various battles, some of them, as shown by historical experience, with weapons in hand. Such a clear and noble idea imparts the necessary drive and consistency to Soviet military strategy.

Another example could be cited where [state] policy cannot provide strategy with a guiding idea, or where this idea is essentially reactionary.

For more than half a century (1799–1863), the policy of Tsarist Russia was guided by the reactionary idea of combating the bourgeois revolution. Hoping to preserve the outmoded, feudal, serf-holding system, Russia became the *gendarme* of Europe. Even though Russia waged many wars during this period, some successfully, its military strategy nevertheless remained inconclusive and inconsistent since all of

mankind.” * ⁴ The notorious ex-President Truman stated this idea more clearly in his message to Congress in December 1945. He asserted that victory in World War II allegedly “. . . has placed upon the American people the continuing burden of responsibility for world leadership.” † Finally, the new president, John Kennedy, in his special message to the American Congress on May 25, 1961, concerning “The Urgent National Needs,” noted that “the government must consider additional long-term measures . . . , if we are to sustain our full role as world leaders.” ⁵

During the first postwar years, American ruling circles attempted to encircle the socialist countries with a system of hostile military-political groups and blocs of capitalist states and to unite the latter into a single anti-Communist coalition. This policy was most clearly expressed in the organization of numerous military, air, and naval bases around the countries of the socialist camp; in the adoption by the American Congress of the essentially expansionist “Truman Doctrine”; in the “Marshall Plan,” which made it possible for the United States to establish control over the economies and policies of the European countries; and in the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” aimed at the enslavement of the Near and Middle Eastern countries.

Aggressive military blocs were formed with the direct and active participation of the United States: in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe; in 1954 in Southeast Asia—SEATO; in 1955 in the Near and Middle East—CENTO. In 1954 at the fourteenth session of the NATO Council in Paris, the United States pushed through a military agreement that made possible the rebirth of West German militarism and its transformation into the NATO striking force. In particular, at the London and Paris meetings the Western powers decided to terminate the occupation regime in the Federal German Republic, to remilitarize it, and to bring it into NATO. In addition, the

* *The War Report*, Washington, 1945, p. 143.

⁴ U.S. ED. NOTE—The original passage reads: “Never was the strength of American democracy so evident nor has it ever been so clearly within our power to give definite guidance for our course into the future of the human race.” General G. Marshall, General H. H. Arnold, Admiral E. King, *The War Report*, J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1947, p. 143.

† *Pravda*, December 23, 1945. [Message to Congress by President Truman on “The Unification of the Armed Forces,” December 14, 1945, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 91, Part a, November 29–December 21, 1945, p. 12398.]

⁵ U.S. ED. NOTE—President Kennedy’s complete sentence reads: “The government must consider additional long-range measures to cure this unemployment and increase our economic growth, if we are to sustain our full role as world leader.” *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1961*, Harper, New York, 1962, p. 73.

In May 1959 the Commander of the American Strategic Air Command, General Power, was even more frank on this subject: "We must never find ourselves in a situation where we cannot begin a war ourselves. . . . We must have the capability to deliver the first strike." *

As is known, the strategy of "massive retaliation" was based on the assumption that the United States had overwhelming superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons and especially in strategic aircraft. Therefore, the United States could be sure of attaining its political and military aims only by threatening to initiate a general nuclear war, which the countries of the socialist camp could not risk because of their inferiority in offensive nuclear forces.

In accord with this strategy, the American government placed the main emphasis on the development of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, to the detriment of conventional armed forces, especially ground forces; this resulted in sharp disagreement between the Army on the one hand, and the Air Force and, to some extent, the Navy on the other. Undoubtedly, such a trend in the development of the armed forces could not fail to cause great dissatisfaction among the representatives of the ground forces and the groups of monopolists who supplied these forces with arms and equipment. The victory of the proponents of the "massive retaliation" strategy was not only a victory for the Air Force and the Navy, but also for the monopolies producing armaments for the Air Force and Navy.

The strategy of "massive retaliation" was adopted not only by the United States but also by the other NATO countries. In December 1954 they began for the first time to plan war operations using nuclear weapons, and later they officially adopted the above strategy, according to which the countries of the North Atlantic aggressive bloc were to use nuclear weapons in any situation, whether or not the opponent used them. Indeed, it was assumed that the NATO countries could not entertain the idea of waging limited war against the Soviet Union in Europe. The possibility of waging limited (local) wars was envisaged only "in the less-developed areas of the world outside Europe. . . ." †

Thus, according to American and NATO aggressive schemes, the mere threat to resort to nuclear weapons was supposed to be a sufficient deterrent, and their use in any conflict was presumed to reduce the offensive capability of the Soviet Armed Forces to nought. However, these hopes were not to be realized.

As a result of the spectacular Soviet success in the field of missile construction and in the conquest of space, the strategy of "massive retaliation" collapsed. Being completely unrealistic in its assumptions, it was

* *Survival* [No. 2, May-June 1959, p. 57.

† Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 37 [p. 8 in English text].

soon rejected by its own creators. Dulles himself declared as early as October 27, 1957, that the United States and its allies must take necessary steps if a local conflict occurred, "without provoking by our actions a general nuclear war." *

In this connection, during 1957–1960 the United States and other Western countries began to study the reasons for the failure of the "retaliatory" strategy and to search intensively for a new strategy which would correspond, from the standpoint of the American aggressors, with the changed balance of forces between the West and the East. This study was conducted by various military and civilian agencies and organizations, such as the scientific-research RAND Corporation,† The Johns Hopkins Washington Center for International Studies, and the Gaither and Rockefeller committees, as well as Harvard, Princeton, Chicago, Pennsylvania, and other American universities. Various American and Western European military leaders have also worked on this problem.

As a result, a considerable number of reports, books, and articles dealing with questions of foreign policy, war, and strategy were published in the United States, England, and other countries.

Thus, in December 1959, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee published a special report, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," which was prepared by The Johns Hopkins Washington Center for International Studies and became an official Congressional document. Furthermore, the following books were published in the United States: *Limited War* by R. Osgood; *Strategy in the Missile Age* by B. Brodie; *The Uncertain Trumpet* by General M. Taylor; *The Necessity for Choice* by H. Kissinger; *The Future U.S. Strategy* by several authors; in England, a book by Air Marshal Kingston-McCloughry, *Defense, Policy and Strategy*; and a number of other books.

The authors of these books and reports agreed, in view of the altered

* *Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy: A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, December 6, 1959, p. 102. [Hereafter cited as *A Study*.]

† The RAND Corporation (from the English RAND—Research and Development) was formed by the U.S. Air Force in 1948 and employs more than 800 prominent scientists. It is charged with the task of determining the types of weapons that satisfy the requirement of contemporary strategy. Other similar organizations are The Johns Hopkins University's Operations Research Office (ORO) which does similar work for the Army, the Navy's Operations Evaluation Group at MIT, and the Institute for Defense Analyses which receives its assignments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of the United States.

situation, in their negative evaluation of the "massive retaliation" strategy and the proposed methods of preparing an aggressive war against the socialist countries and other areas of the world. A considerable number of the studies mentioned above were prepared at the behest of U.S. governmental and military agencies and therefore exerted a certain influence on the formulation of the official views of American ruling circles.

The most up-to-date publications that clarify the nature of current Western military strategy are the report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, General M. Taylor's *The Uncertain Trumpet*, and Professor H. Kissinger's book, *The Necessity for Choice*.*

The main reasons for the failure of the strategy of "massive retaliation" were the overestimation of American strength and capabilities, and the obvious underestimation of the economic, technical, scientific, and military capabilities of the Soviet Union. As a result of the Soviet Union's significant superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles, a real threat to American territory had arisen.⁹ Therefore, American political and military leadership was compelled to reassess its strategic position and capabilities.

The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted that "termination of the American nuclear monopoly and growing Soviet strategic capabilities have increased the difficulties of maintaining a military posture appropriate to the pursuit of established American objectives." † This report was quite sober in its assessment of the resources of the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to the size of their territory, population, and industrial potential, as well as to the continuance of the traditional advantages derived by America from a secure continent. The Committee noted that "the military position of the United States has declined . . . from one of unchallenged security to that of a nation both open and vulnerable to direct and devastating attack." ‡

An even more unfavorable appraisal of the United States position was given by H. Kissinger, who proposed that illusions about American invulnerability be abandoned.

* In 1961, Taylor and Kissinger were appointed special military and political advisers to President Kennedy, and nearly everything that they proposed in their books has been or is being put into practice. Prior to his appointment, Kissinger was a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. [General Taylor is at present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.]

⁹ U.S. ED. NOTE—This refers to the Soviet claims to general military and specifically strategic-missile superiority over the United States. These were most clearly stated by Khrushchev in January 1960 (*Pravda*, January 15, 1960).

† *A Study*, p. 1.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

In referring to the tremendous influence of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic on the course of world social development, he bitterly admitted that "the success of Moscow and Peiping will have the same kind of attraction as the accomplishment of Europe in the nineteenth century. No amount of economic assistance will avail against the conviction that the West is doomed." *

It is significant that in his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in the United States in 1957, Kissinger still argued for a strategy based on the threat of unlimited use of nuclear weapons, i.e., in favor of initiating a general nuclear war. However, the events of the past four years have forced him to arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions, involving the necessity for a choice, as he has expressed it, "between humiliation and general nuclear war."

Even President Kennedy himself was forced to admit the increased military strength of the Soviet Union and the loss of alleged American superiority in strategic weapons, when he stated in Seattle in November 1961 that the United States was neither omnipotent nor omniscient. †

Thus, under the conditions of today, when there is a "balance" (approximate "equality") in strategic weapons and Soviet superiority in conventional armed forces, the American strategists are forced to re-evaluate their previous attitude toward general nuclear war. ‡¹⁰

They understand that when both sides possess very large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and various means of delivering them to targets, primarily strategic means, a general nuclear war holds great risks of complete mutual annihilation.§ Consequently, the greater the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, the greater becomes the conviction that it is impossible to use them. Thus the growth of nuclear-missile power is inversely proportional to the possibility of its use. A "nuclear

* Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* [Harper, New York], 1961, p. 7.

† *New York Times*, November 17, 1961.

‡ By "balance" of forces the Americans understand "albeit an approximate, shifting and sometimes unstable equilibrium, in which neither side has, or believes it has power sufficient to impose its will on its adversary by the threat or use of force." (*A Study*, p. 31.)

¹⁰ U.S. ED. NOTE—In his speech in Moscow to the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, Khrushchev said: "In reality under the banner of the 'doctrine of balance of forces' plans are made [in the West] for the initiation of a preventive war." *Pravda*, July 11, 1962. However, from August 1961 and repeatedly in 1962 Khrushchev insisted that the United States had acknowledged that Soviet strategic power was equal to its own. See, for example, *Pravda*, August 8, October 18, 1961; January 17, 1963.

§ At a press conference on November 29, 1961, President Kennedy declared: "Now, while we rely on our nuclear weapons we also, as I have said, want to have a choice between humiliation and holocaust." [*New York Times*, November 30, 1961.]

stalemate," to use the Western expression, had arisen; on the one hand a tremendous increase in the number of missiles and nuclear weapons, and on the other hand the incredible danger of their use. Under these conditions, according to the evaluation of American and NATO political and military circles, both sides had attained the position of so-called "mutual deterrence."

All this led to the conclusion that the strategy of "massive retaliation" was inflexible and could no longer assure the attainment of the political aims of the American imperialists. Whereas previously the United States could, with almost complete impunity, threaten unlimited use of nuclear weapons in any situation, even the possible outbreak of a local (limited) military conflict, the change in the balance of forces had made it dangerous to engage in "nuclear blackmail" and to risk the security of one's own country.

This circumstance has had an especially strong effect on the European satellites of the United States. In particular, by the end of 1959 the Western European Alliance had already openly noted in its decisions that the European countries could no longer rely exclusively on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, as they had previously. There was no reason to expect that the Americans would automatically become involved in an armed conflict in which there was a risk of exposing themselves to a nuclear blow from the Soviet Union. Thus the European countries raised the question of creating their own independent strategic nuclear forces.

On the basis of their assessment of the new situation, American political and military leaders began to consider the so-called strategy of "flexible response" more acceptable and expedient. In their opinion, this would permit the conduct of either general nuclear war or limited wars, with or without nuclear weapons.

The strategy of "flexible response" was formulated by General Taylor in the book mentioned above, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, where he reveals the essence of this strategy and the mode of its conduct:

The strategic doctrine, which I would propose to replace massive retaliation, is called herein the Strategy of Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping with anything [. . .].*

In other words, the strategy proposed by Taylor is suitable, in his opinion, for all contingencies and provides an answer to any situation.

In an article entitled "Security Will Not Wait," published in the January 1961 issue of the American journal *Foreign Affairs*, Taylor formu-

* Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 38 [p. 6 in the English text].

lated the basic principles of this strategy and the general military program of the U.S. Government in the following manner:

(a) The creation of an invulnerable strategic missile force, capable of delivering a crippling blow to the enemy "even after absorbing a surprise nuclear attack."

(b) The formation of adequate and properly equipped mobile forces for limited wars, "i.e., armed conflicts short of general atomic war between two nuclear power blocs."

(c) The formation of an effective system of military alliances.

(d) The assurance of the most favorable use of resources allocated to the military program.

The new strategic concept of the United States and NATO, therefore, was already essentially determined by the time Kennedy came to power, and the new President became its most fervent exponent.

In his messages to Congress on March 28 and May 25, as well as in his televised appearance on July 25, 1961, President Kennedy described aspects of the new strategic concept and the military program of the United States in some detail.

The strategic concept, the message of March 28, 1961, stressed, "must be both flexible and determined" and must prepare for the conduct of any war: general or local, nuclear or conventional, large or small. This concept is based upon the same idea as a "retaliatory strike," the only difference being that, whereas previously the threat of such a strike implied the unlimited use of nuclear weapons regardless of the scale of [the existing] conflict, i.e., a general nuclear war, now the "retaliatory strike" must be appropriate to the nature of the potential conflict.

The message noted that the United States must increase the capability of its armed forces "to respond swiftly and effectively" to any enemy action. In a world war this would mean that such a capability must be retained by that part of the armed forces which "survives the first strike." The message pointed out the prime importance of the ability to survive the enemy's first strike and to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike "in order to inflict unacceptable losses upon him." The President stressed that the ability to deter an enemy attack depended not only on the number of missiles and bombers but also on their state of readiness, their ability to survive attack, and the flexibility and sureness with which they were controlled to achieve strategic objectives.

Referring to the possible conduct of limited wars, the message stated that the United States and its allies must be capable of waging such wars with conventional weapons. If the forces with conventional weapons are unable to achieve the desired objectives, however, nuclear weapons could be used. At the same time, the probability of a limited war expanding into a general war was not denied, but it was stressed that all

necessary measures must be taken to localize the conflict and to prevent it from causing the outbreak of a general nuclear war.

The U.S. military program outlined by President Kennedy in his messages and speeches provided for the organization and preparation of the armed forces for general nuclear war as well as for limited wars.

Thus, the strategy of "massive retaliation" which existed prior to 1961 in the United States and NATO, and which provided for the preparation and conduct only of general nuclear war against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, has become obsolete and is being replaced by the strategy of "flexible response," which provides for the preparation and conduct not only of general nuclear war but also of limited wars, with or without the use of nuclear weapons, against the socialist countries.

At first glance the following may seem strange. On the one hand, American and NATO political and military leaders believe a general nuclear war to be implausible, or more precisely, unpromising, in the sense that it would lead to mutual annihilation, [a belief that explains] why the former strategy was rejected. On the other hand, the newly adopted strategy, while more flexible, again provides primarily for the capability and readiness for general nuclear war. But this is only an apparent contradiction.

The admission of the possibility that they might conduct a nuclear war, despite its unlikelihood, proves that the American imperialists are ready to embark upon any monstrous crimes against mankind to prevent their own inevitable destruction. Such a war would be an extreme measure; it might be initiated by the aggressors when all other measures had failed to give tangible results in the struggle with the socialist camp.

The question is this: If general nuclear war is dangerous to both sides, then what must be done so that it can lead to the attainment of the desired objectives, i.e., the destruction of the enemy with the least possible losses and destruction for oneself? The American imperialists and their Western European allies answer this question as follows: first, sharply step up the arms race, especially missiles, and nuclear and space weapons; and second, [achieve] surprise. The first [measure] must assure overwhelming quantitative superiority over the enemy in the most advanced strategic weapons, primarily missiles, and nuclear and space weapons, in order to make possible a continuing policy of "intimidation"¹¹ toward the Soviet Union and to facilitate negotiations with it from a "position of strength."

¹¹ U.S. FD. NOTE—The Western notion of deterrence is rendered in Russian either by the word, *ustrashenie* (intimidation) or *sderzhivanie* which means "holding in check." Although both terms are used to characterize American policy, only the latter is used to describe Soviet policy.

Surprise assures the seizure of initiative, the rapid destruction of the enemy's armed forces, in particular his strategic forces and weapons, the disruption of his control over troops and the country as a whole, the undermining of his economy, and the demoralization of the people. It is believed [by the Western powers] that the enemy could be paralyzed in all respects by a powerful attack and that his fate would be determined during the very first days of the war.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee has made a complete appraisal of the role of surprise in contemporary war. Rejecting any talk of "peacefulness," [the document] openly calls for a surprise nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp:

The advent of the nuclear-missile weapons generation [heralded by the Soviet ICBM test of August 1957¹²] brought a drastic compression in the time required for the delivery of nuclear explosions at intercontinental ranges and a corresponding reduction in the attack-warning time . . . [available to the victim of strategic aggression¹³]. These effects, added to the fact that there is as yet no active defense whatsoever against an intercontinental missile in flight, have gravely increased the temptation to strike first in a nuclear war.*

Thus it is no accident that American military theorists are carefully studying the advantages and disadvantages of preventive war, a first strike, and a pre-emptive attack.

The theory of preventive war was first advanced at the end of the 1940's by the most reactionary representatives of the American political and military leadership, when America possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons. However, propaganda for this theory subsided when the Soviet Union also acquired such weapons. Now the American military leaders and scientists have returned to the study of preventive war, viewing it as a possible and acceptable choice. What is meant by preventive war? B. Brodie gives the following definition in his book, *Strategy in the Missile Age*:

I am using the term to describe a premeditated attack by one country against another, which is unprovoked in the sense that it does not wait upon a specific aggression or other overt action by the target state, and in which the chief and most immediate objective is the destruction of the latter's over-all military power and especially its strategic armed forces. Naturally, success in such an action would

¹² U.S. ED. NOTE—The Soviet authors omitted these words, without indicating an ellipsis.

¹³ U.S. ED. NOTE—The Soviet authors omitted these words, but indicated an ellipsis.

* *A Study*, p. 3.

enable the former power to wreak whatever further injury it desired or to exact almost any peace terms it wished.*

In Brodie's opinion, arguments in favor of preventive war are based primarily on two premises: first, that in a strategic air and space war with nuclear weapons the one who strikes first will undoubtedly gain an important advantage, which with reasonably good planning will almost surely be conclusive; and second, that total war is inevitable.

Brodie emphasizes that:

The least that can be said is that our plan for strategic attack, whatever it is, would have its best chances of being carried out if we struck first, and that these chances would be brought to a very low minimum if the enemy struck first. If we thought *only* [italics in English edition only] about maximizing our chances of survival, the above circumstances might be considered reason enough for going ahead with preventive war.†

This is how frankly the American theorists speak in favor of preventive war and surprise attack. Brodie is an associate of The RAND Corporation; consequently his statements not only reflect his personal views but also those of the leaders of the Air Force and other American military agencies in whose interests The RAND Corporation works. The conclusions and recommendations made by members of this corporation are not simply "voices in the wilderness"; they are listened to and adopted, since otherwise the corporation's activity would be meaningless.¹⁴

However, American officials, such as government and military representatives, who agree with the conclusions reached by their expert scientists and who implement them, prefer to use other terms to persuade the peoples of the world of their "peaceful intentions." Even Brodie is compelled to acknowledge this when he states that the partisans of preventive war employed by the government consider it "impolitic" to express their views publicly on this subject.‡ Therefore, even though these officials always assert that preventive war is "incompatible" with the principles of American "democracy" and "morality," they fully share these views.

* B. Brodie, *Strategiia v vek raketnogo oruzhiia* [*Strategy in the Missile Age*], Moscow, 1961, fn. 2, pp. 249–250 [English edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1959, pp. 227–228].

† *Ibid.*, p. 253 [p. 231 in English text].

¹⁴ U.S. ED. NOTE—In his book *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Brodie describes the preventive war thesis only in order to take issue with it. He points out that "it would be presumptuous and reckless in the extreme to base so cataclysmic an action on the thesis that total war is inevitable or nearly so." *Ibid.*, p. 232 in English text.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 251 [p. 229 in English text].

Thus it follows that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by the American imperialists against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. The slogan of such a war is: "What was inevitable had better come early rather than late . . . because it would be less devastating that way." * This slogan has many temptations for them, since the aggressor picks the time he thinks most favorable to begin the preventive war. The American imperialists believe that the military potential of the United States is much more capable of destroying the Soviet Union now than it will be in the future, particularly by preventive war.¹⁵

Some military ideologists such as Kissinger substitute the term "surprise (first) strike" for the term "preventive war." This is a purely formal distinction, since the first strike can also mean the beginning of preventive war. But no matter what the attack is called, its main feature is the achievement of maximum surprise.

Surprise can and must be achieved in a pre-emptive blow. Such a blow is defensive, according to American military theorists, since it is dealt to an enemy who is ready to attack (to initiate a preventive war or deal a first blow). It is considered to be the final and only means of avoiding disaster.

This is how they assess the factor of surprise, which can be achieved by initiating a preventive war and by dealing a first or pre-emptive blow.

The United States simultaneously devotes considerable attention to defensive measures. Moreover, American leaders consider two matters to be of decisive importance: the time factor and, above all, the invulnerability of their strategic forces and weapons.

It is generally acknowledged immensely important to receive warning of an attack in good time, to remove the armed forces, especially the strategic, from the [vicinity of the expected] blow, to prepare a retaliatory strike, to alert the population for civil defense purposes, etc.

In September 1960, Kennedy, while still a presidential candidate, formed a temporary committee under the chairmanship of Senator Symington (former Secretary of the Air Force) to study the organization of the American military command and its suitability in the prevailing military, political, and strategic conditions. In early December of 1960,

* *Ibid.*

¹⁵ U.S. ED. NOTE—This refers to the reassessment by the United States in the fall of 1961 of the strategic military balance which, the Department of Defense indicated, favored the United States. (See speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense R. L. Gilpatric at Hot Springs, Virginia, on October 21, 1961, *New York Times*, October 22, 1961; Secretary of Defense R. S. McNamara's testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, *New York Times*, January 20, 1962, and speech in Chicago on February 17, 1962, *New York Times*, February 18, 1962.)

the committee submitted a report to Kennedy, entitled "Plan for Broad Revision in the Defense Set-Up"¹⁶ of the United States," which emphasized that any evaluation of America's military position would have to take into account "one salient factor [which] stands out above the rest." At the prevailing level of technical development, this factor was time; according to the committee, time was important for the following three reasons:

(1) The unprecedented strategic value of time in assuring the ability to react instantly in the present nuclear-space age. According to the committee, the United States had at least eighteen months for its preparations prior to entering World Wars I and II; however, in a general nuclear war the available reaction time would be at most eighteen minutes.

(2) Time is of crucial importance in the United States vs. Soviet arms race. The committee emphasized that a sufficiently up-to-date weapons system must be chosen and that the lead time between conception and use [i.e., operational readiness] of weapons must be minimized.

(3) Time affects defense costs. Regardless of how much the United States spends for military purposes, "time cannot be bought." Thus it is important to keep in mind the costly effect of building weapons which have become obsolescent as a result of delay.

At present, when missiles have "fantastically reduced the time necessary to deliver nuclear warheads from one continent to another," reaction time is literally measured in minutes. For example, a missile would require only thirty minutes to fly from America to the Eurasian continent, or vice versa; even less time may be required in the future.

Consequently, American political and military leaders seek all possible ways and means to gain additional time. The solution of this problem is believed to lie in the launching of special artificial satellites that can detect launchings of intercontinental ballistic missiles and signal this information back to earth. In addition, the Americans are building radar stations to track launchings of ballistic missiles.

Another equally important problem is to ensure the relative invulnerability of the armed forces, especially strategic forces and weapons. American and NATO political and military leaders believe that this problem can be solved by the creation of a large variety of strategic weapons instead of a single weapon: solid-fuel intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles, missile-carrying nuclear submarines, medium and heavy bombers armed with ballistic air-to-ground long-range missiles, and, in the near future, special space weapons.

One such measure is the construction of underground and mobile

¹⁶ U.S. ED. NOTE—*New York Times*, December 6, 1960.

launchers for solid-fuel intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles, in order to make their detection and destruction more difficult. In addition, all combat-ready intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as a significant portion of the Strategic and Tactical Air Force Commands, are to be maintained on a fifteen-minute alert, and the number of airborne heavy bombers carrying nuclear bombs will be increased. A reliable system of communication, guidance, and warning is to be created.

It should be noted that the maintenance of a significant number of strategic and tactical weapons on a fifteen-minute alert and the increase in the number of airborne heavy bombers secure a double advantage: first, considerable preparedness to deliver a surprise attack, and second, quick launching in order to avoid destruction and deliver a retaliatory (counter) strike. However, an immediate retaliatory strike, if it were possible, could be delivered only by surviving missile forces, which would include missile-carrying nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, and airborne heavy bombers on patrol. The remaining strategic and tactical aircraft that had taken off to escape the blow would have to land again on the surviving airfields to refuel and to pick up nuclear weapons before proceeding to execute their mission.

The United States military command today is seriously concerned over the vulnerability of its strategic air force. For this reason it is carrying out measures to disperse and protect its aircraft, and is further increasing the forces on alert on airfields and in the air. In order to shorten the reaction time required for [launching] a strike, the Americans are studying the possibility of maintaining airplanes loaded with nuclear bombs on ground alert.

Missile-carrying nuclear submarines are considered the most invulnerable [strategic weapon carriers, while close behind these are] underground and mobile launching installations for intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles, carrier planes, and, in the future, space weapons.

U.S. NOTE B: THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF RECENT U.S. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

[The true Soviet views on Western strategies and intentions are difficult to assess on the basis of public Soviet statements, which usually serve the tendentious purpose of attributing aggressive intentions to the West. The propaganda motive results in a certain amount of inconsistency in the public Soviet interpretations of Western strategies. For example, it is argued that the growth of Soviet military power has forced the West to give up its reliance on a general war strategy and to

develop instead limited-war and "flexible response" doctrines, yet it is also alleged that the latter reflect a Western intention to initiate a preventive general nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

Public Soviet interpretation of Western strategies, especially as expressed by Khrushchev has undergone marked changes over the years. From the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power Khrushchev showed an increasing tendency to stress the growing effectiveness of Soviet military power as a deterrent of Western aggression, and to de-emphasize the danger of a rational premeditated attack by the West against the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In 1956, for example, Khrushchev had reversed Leninist theory by asserting that, because of the growth of the moral and material strength of the socialist camp and of worldwide forces favoring peace, war was "not fatalistically inevitable."¹⁸ By 1959, it was said that the West increasingly recognized the deterrent effect of Soviet military power. In May of that year Khrushchev declared:

The imperialists know our strength. To attack us is tantamount to suicide; one would have to be insane to do this. I do not believe they are as stupid as all that; they understand the consequences which the unleashing of war against the socialist countries may have for them. . . .¹⁹

A few months later he asserted that the West would "hardly dare to launch a war against our motherland" and that "our forces and those of our socialist allies are colossal, and in the West, apparently, this is now understood."²⁰ Although war might still be unleashed by a madman, Khrushchev asserted, such an attempt could be "cut short" and "a straightjacket" found for the culprit.²¹ As indicated in the Analytical Introduction, Khrushchev's public confidence in the deterrent effect of Soviet arms reached a high point in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960. In this speech, Khrushchev claimed that in missiles the Soviet Union had a five-year lead over the United States and that "the Soviet Army today possesses such combat means and fire power as no army has ever had before," sufficient "literally to wipe the country or countries that attack us off the face of the earth."²² Consequently, Khrushchev said, "the Soviet people can be calm and

¹⁷ See A. L. Horelick, "Deterrence" and Surprise Attack in Soviet Strategic Thought, The RAND Corporation, RM-2618, July 1960.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

¹⁹ *Pravda*, June 1, 1959.

²⁰ *Pravda*, July 30, 1959.

²¹ *Pravda*, October 15, 1958; January 28, 1959.

²² *Pravda*, January 15, 1960.

confident: the Soviet Army's modern equipment ensures the unassailability of our country." A few months later Khrushchev boasted that "the Soviet Union is now the world's strongest military power."²³ Khrushchev used these claims to buttress his demands for a settlement on Soviet terms of various issues in dispute with the West.

Following the American reassessment of the strategic balance of power in the fall of 1961, the Soviet interpretation of U.S. strategy and intentions changed. Already, during the second half of 1961, Soviet public statements had placed more emphasis on Western aggressiveness. However, Soviet statements no longer emphasized the irrationality of a Western attack on the Soviet Union, but accused the West and especially the United States of preparing a preventive war. This interpretation of U.S. intentions was voiced first by Marshal Malinovskii²⁴ and then by Khrushchev²⁵ after the publication in March of a statement by President Kennedy in which the President said: "Of course, in some circumstances we must be prepared to use nuclear weapons at the start, come what may—a clear attack on Western Europe for example." And again: "In some circumstances we might have to take the initiative."²⁶

Soviet spokesmen no longer claimed over-all strategic superiority over the United States, but strategic parity or qualitative superiority on the basis of missile technology and the large yields of some of their nuclear weapons.²⁷ Accordingly, they called for a further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces.

After the Soviet edition of this book had gone to press, in a speech at Ann Arbor on June 16, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced adoption of the so-called counterforce strategy.²⁸ "Given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain through the years ahead," said McNamara, "a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for an enemy." He continued:

The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should

²³ *Izvestiia*, March 2, 1960.

²⁴ *Pravda*, May 1, 2, 1962.

²⁵ *Pravda*, July 11, 1962.

²⁶ Stewart Alsop, "Kennedy's Grand Strategy," *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 31, 1962, pp. 11, 13.

²⁷ See Khrushchev in *Pravda*, October 18, 1961, and Marshal Malinovskii in *Pravda*, January 25, 1962; Malinovskii, "The Program of the CPSU and the Question of Strengthening the Armed Forces of the USSR," *Kommunist*, No. 7, May 1962, p. 14.

²⁸ *Vital Speeches of the Day*, August 1, 1962, pp. 626–629.

be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

In a subsequent statement Secretary McNamara denied that this implied the adoption by the United States of a first-strike strategy:

What I said meant exactly the opposite. Because we have a sure second-strike capability, there is no pressure on us whatsoever to preempt. . . . One point I was making in the Ann Arbor speech is that our second-strike capability is so sure that there would be no rational basis on which to launch a preemptive strike.²⁹

The public Soviet assessment of the "counterforce" strategy was in accord with the previous Soviet official interpretation of the "controlled response" strategy. Soviet commentators flatly rejected any Soviet commitment to restrict the use of nuclear weapons and denied the feasibility of avoiding the destruction of cities, especially if the Soviet Union were to use its 50- and 100-megaton weapons according to "McNamara's rules." The United States Government, according to Soviet comments, was trying to establish "rules" of nuclear war in order to make it more acceptable to the American people. It was asserted that "McNamara's statement shows concrete and practical evidence of preparation for a preventive war."³⁰ Khrushchev expressed similar views in his speech of July 10, 1962, and asserted in addition that the new strategy represented an attempt to divert the main weight of Soviet nuclear retaliation to American overseas bases and forces.^{31]}

²⁹ Stewart Alsop, "Our New Strategy," *The Saturday Evening Post*, December 1, 1962, p. 18.

³⁰ Marshal Sokolovskii, "A Suicidal Strategy," *Red Star*, July 19, 1962. See also Major General M. Mil'shtein, "Certain Strategic Military Concepts of the American Imperialists," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia* (*World Economics and International Relations*), No. 8, August 1962; Major General N. Talenskii, "Preventive War—Nuclear Suicide," *International Affairs*, No. 9, August 1962, pp. 10–16. Colonel General A. Rytov, "The USSR Air Force Day," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (*Communist of the Armed Forces*), No. 15, August 1962, p. 14; Chief Air Marshal K. Vershinin, "Aviation in Modern War," *Izvestiia*, December 23, 1962.

³¹ *Pravda*, July 11, 1962. See also January 17, 1963.

Preparation of New Wars by Imperialist States

Development and Growth of the Armed Forces. The United States and NATO are developing their armed forces along lines determined by the strategic concepts they adopted in 1961 and by their views on the possible nature of present-day war. This development is based on the so-called principle of "interdependence" of the political, economic, and military spheres of the NATO countries, a principle that was advanced by American ruling circles in 1950. Later the principle was extended to include countries participating in other military and political alliances.

The basic aim of this principle imposed by the Americans is to create "balanced" military forces within the framework of the aggressive military blocs, and hence to define the responsibility of each participating country or group of countries in the development of whatever national armed forces the United States may deem necessary.

The United States and to a certain extent Great Britain have taken over the task of developing, preparing, and using primarily offensive strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons, because these countries have the greatest military, economic, and technical potential. The remaining countries of NATO and the other military blocs have undertaken principally the development of ground forces, and of small air forces and navies intended to support the operations of the ground forces and to execute auxiliary tasks.

The American imperialists, who have all the strategic weapons at their disposal, exert political and military pressure on their allies to force them to pursue policies advantageous to the United States.

Hence this so-called "interdependence" does not sit well with some NATO countries, primarily France and West Germany, which are attempting to play a greater military and political role than that assigned to them. French, and particularly West German, ruling circles object to the complete domination of the Americans, and to some extent of the British, over the [Western] military blocs, and insist upon a revision of the principle of "interdependence." They demand that nuclear weapons and the strategic means for delivering them be put in their hands.

At the present time, the organization and preparation of the armed forces of the countries in NATO and other aggressive military blocs are designed for limited wars, wherever they may break out, as well as for general nuclear war. However, the principal efforts still emphasize the preparation for general nuclear war.

45 per cent of the gross national product was used to satisfy war requirements in 1944.

During World War II, the principal capitalist countries created large defense industries. The maximum annual production of the main types of armaments in these countries are shown by the following data (in thousands of units).

Types of Armaments	United States	England	Germany
Bombers	35.0	7.9	6.5
Fighter aircraft	38.8	10.7	28.9
Tanks and self-propelled guns	38.6	8.6	18.9
Artillery (75 mm. and larger)	16.7	3.0	40.7
Mortars	39.2	25.1	30.8
Warships (thousands of tons of standard displacement)	1402.	233.9	No information available

The above armament production rates were attained by the countries named in early 1944, i.e., almost three years after the beginning of the war for the United States and four years for Germany and England.

The experience of World War II, and in particular its final outcome, provided the modern imperialist countries with extensive data on strategic planning and economic mobilization for war.

Today the military strategy of the principal countries in the Anglo-American coalition is based upon the principle that in future wars they will have little time to develop defense industry and very little time to organize mass production of the most important types of weapons. Consequently the United States and Great Britain, when carrying out their postwar demobilization, conserved their military industrial potential in such a fashion as to assure, in an emergency, the production of large amounts of the principal types of armaments and military equipment.

The military strategy of the Western countries is based on the fact that the imperialist coalition consists of countries with different levels of economic development. This is shown by the following data [first table, p. 194] on the production of the main capitalist countries in percentages of world capitalist production.

More than four-fifths of the entire capitalist production is concentrated in NATO countries. The United States accounts for more than one half of the production, though this percentage is continually decreasing. From 1950 to 1960, the industrial production of West Germany increased by a factor of almost 2.5, that of Italy by 2.2, France

weapons, strategic bombers, intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, new warships, and air defense weapons for both the continental [United States] and troops [in the field].

The high level of defense expenditures during this period permitted the operation of a large war industry and the production of a considerable number of modern weapons. Simultaneously, the capacity to produce missiles and nuclear weapons increased.

In 1960, U.S. defense industry employed more than four million people; approximately two million were directly involved in military production.

The United States has devoted particular attention to the expansion of its nuclear industry, whose potential is still increasing at the present time. By early 1961, the United States had five important centers for producing fissionable materials (uranium 235, plutonium, and lithium deuteride), fourteen plants for producing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and many other supporting enterprises. The nuclear industry employs 122,000 people.

American ruling circles attach tremendous importance to the development of their missile industry. More than 170 firms employing 400,000 people are engaged in the production of missiles. Primary attention is directed toward the accelerated development and production of strategic missiles.

The extent of American efforts to develop strategic missiles can be judged by the expenditures for their development and production, which have been constantly increasing. During the 1960–1961 fiscal year they amounted to almost 4.4 billion dollars. During the eight-year period from 1953–1960, more than 14.8 billion dollars were spent for this purpose. By the end of 1965, American industry is to produce a minimum of 135 Atlas missiles, 108 Titan missiles, and 800 Minuteman missiles, in addition to 656 Polaris missiles for missile-carrying nuclear submarines. However, the total production of these missiles apparently will be somewhat higher. According to the press, approximately 1,000 Polaris missiles are planned for the 41 missile-carrying nuclear submarines to be constructed.

The United States also produces a considerable number of tactical missiles. During the 1960–1961 fiscal year, 3.5 billion dollars were spent on the development and production of these missiles. The industrial base already in existence not only meets the requirements of the American armed forces, but also makes it possible to supply considerable numbers of these weapons to other capitalist states.

The United States has a large aircraft industry consisting of more than two hundred companies employing almost 600,000 people. During

No form of strategic operation or operation by any branch of the Armed Forces is executed in isolation or independently. No operations by units or branches of the Armed Forces are independent in the strict sense of the word. A future war can only be conducted successfully if all strategic operations are strictly co-ordinated by a unified centralized command and single strategic plan, and are purposefully directed toward the execution of the general aims of the armed combat.

Let us make a more detailed examination of these types of strategic operation and of the basic combat operations of each branch of the Armed Forces, remembering, however, that there can be no independent military operations in a modern war.

Nuclear strikes by strategic missiles will be of decisive, primary importance to the outcome of a modern war. Massive nuclear blows on the enemy's strategic nuclear weapons, economy, and system of governmental control, and the concurrent defeat of his armed forces in military theaters will permit the attainment of the political aims of war much more rapidly than in previous wars.

In case of war, our Armed Forces will be obliged to employ this form of strategic operation. The aggressive imperialist bloc is preparing a war which will involve general destruction of cities, industrial regions and targets [in these regions], and communication networks, and mass annihilation by nuclear blows of the civilian population throughout the entire territory of the socialist countries. The major aim will be to destroy the economy and weapons of war, to disrupt the system of governmental control, and to demoralize the population, thus undermining its will and capacity to resist.

By using highly destructive weapons—nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction—the imperialists will attempt to destroy the social system of the socialist countries even to the point of the complete annihilation of entire states of the socialist commonwealth. And they are not concealing their plans. For example, H. Kissinger wrote in his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*:

The notion that wars are won by destroying the enemy's industrial plant and undermining civilian morale has been as cardinal a tenet in British as in American strategic thought.*

For a long time the United States has had a special section in the Department of Defense to plan the targeting of the strategic nuclear weapons of attack. This section notes all important targets in the so-

* H. Kissinger, *Iadernoe oruzhie i vneshniaia politika* [*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*], Izdatel'stvo Inostrannoi Literatury, Moscow, 1959, p. 373 [English edition p. 275].

Conclusion

Any truly scientific theory reflects the objective laws governing the various phenomena of social life. Soviet military theory, which is just such a theory, reflects the laws of war as an armed struggle in the name of the interests of the most progressive social class—the proletariat. Consequently, in this work the study of the various aspects of war could not be in the nature of an objective investigation. Although war, as a two-sided process of struggle, has a number of objective features, the authors as representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces naturally could not consider these features from the position of an outside observer, but always started with the Marxist-Leninist concepts of the essential nature of war in the modern epoch, its causes, and how it starts.

According to Marxist-Leninist dialectics, objective evaluation of the various phenomena of social development means that the investigator cannot be neutral, but is always the representative and proponent of the ideology of his class.

Lenin stated: “For the first time in the history of the world struggle, the army contains elements which do not carry the banners of a despised regime, but who are guided by the idea of the struggle for liberation of the exploited.” * Only a firm conviction in the triumph of these ideas permits the correct evaluation of so complex a phenomenon of social life as war, and permits the most valid definition of the content and tasks of military strategy.

* V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia [Works]*, Vol. 26, p. 421.